Abstract. At CRYPTO'16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with SIMON. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft-and hardware, possesses a Substitution-Permutation-Network structure, and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as key and tweak sizes of 64, 128, 192, and 256 bits. This paper outlines a related-tweakey impossibledifferential attack on 21 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 and two attacks on 22 and 23 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 under the assumption that 48 bits of the tweakey are public.
Introduction
SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers recently proposed at CRYPTO 2016 by Beierle et al. [3] . Its goal was to design a cipher that could be implemented highly efficiently on both soft-and hardware platforms, with performance comparable or better than the SIMON and SPECK families of block ciphers [1] . Like the NSA designs SIMON and SPECK, SKINNY supports a wide range of block sizes and tweak/key sizes -however, in contrast to the And-RX and Add-RX based NSA proposals, SKINNY should base on the better understood Substitution-Permutation-Network approach. SKINNY offers a large security margin within the number of rounds for each member of the SKINNY family. The designers show that the currently best known attacks approach close to half of the number of rounds of the cipher. To motivate third-party cryptanalysis, the designers of SKINNY recently announced a cryptanalysis competition [2] for SKINNY-64/128 and SKINNY-128/128 with the obvious challenge of attacking more rounds than the preliminary analysis, concerning both the single-and related-key models. AddRoundTweakey (ART) adds the round tweakey to the first two state rows.
ShiftRows (SR) rotates the i th row, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, by i positions to the right. Tweakey Schedule. The tweakey schedule of SKINNY, as illustrated in Figure 2 , follows the TWEAKEY framework [5] . As a major contrast to previous TWEAKEY designs Deoxys-BC and Joltik-BC, SKINNY employs a significantly more lightweight strategy. In each round, only the two topmost rows of each tweakey word are extracted and XORed to the state. An additional round-dependent constant is also XORed to the state to prevent attacks from symmetry, such as slide attacks, and complicate subspace cryptanalysis. The 128-bit tweakey is arranged in two 64-bit tweakey words, represented by 4×4 matrices T K 1 and T K 2 . As mentioned, the arrangement is row-wise and nibbleby-nibble. In each round, the tweakey words are updated by a cell permutation P T that ensures that the two bottom rows of a tweakey word in a certain round are exchanged with the two top rows in the tweakey word in the subsequent round. The permutation is given as: P T = {9, 15, 8, 13, 10, 14, 12, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
MixColumns (MC)
The permutation P T has a period of 16, as visualized in Fig. 7 in the appendix. Moreover, each individual cell in the two topmost rows of the tweakey word T K 2 is transformed by a 4-bit LFSR to thwart iterative differentials; T K 1 employs no LFSR transformation. The LFSR based transformation L is given by L(x 3 , x 2 , x 1 , x 0 ) := (x 2 , x 1 , x 0 , x 3 ⊕ x 2 ), where x 3 , x 2 , x 1 , x 0 represent the individual bits (x 0 represents the LSB of the cell) of every tweakey nibble. To avoid confusion, the update equation for the tweak cells can be written explicitly as:
otherwise.
where T K r a [i] represents the i th nibble of T K a (a = 1, 2) in round r. Note that the r th -round tweakey is given by
3 Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack
Impossible-differential attacks were introduced independently by Biham et al. [4] and Knudsen [6] . They are widely used as an important cryptanalytic technique. The attack starts with finding an input difference that can never result in an output difference, which makes up an impossible differential. By adding rounds before and/or after the impossible differential, one can collect pairs with certain plaintext and ciphertext differences. If there exists a pair that meets the input and output values of the impossible differential under some subkey, these subkeys must be wrong. In this way, we can filter as many wrong keys as possible and exhaustively search the rest of the keys.
Notations. Before proceeding, let us state a few notations that we will use in the attack description:
K r represents the r th round key. This is equal to T K Impossible-Differential Trail. Fig. 3 presents the 11-round related-key differential trail that we use in this paper. We introduce a nibble difference in Cell 8 of the combined tweakey. Since the initial difference is in Cell 8, i.e. in one of the bottom two rows in the tweakey, it does not affect the state in the first round, and will be introduced in the state from the second round onwards. Similarly in the backward trail, the difference in the 11 th round tweakey appears in Cell 11 (also situated in one of the bottom two rows), due to which we get an extra round in the backward direction too. Proof. The above fact can be deduced by analyzing the Differential-Distribution Table ( DDT ) of the S-box S as illustrated in Table 1 in the appendix. The average can be calculated as
A similar exercise can be done for the inverse S-box yielding the same result.
Lemma 2.
For random values of x and ∆ i , ∆ o = 0, the equation S(x + ∆ i ) + S(x) = ∆ o holds with probability around 2 −4 .
Proof. The above fact can also be deduced by analyzing the Differential-Distribution Table ( DDT ) of the S-box S as illustrated in Table 1 in the appendix. The probability can be calculated as (let Pr[(x, δ i , δ o ) denote the probablility that the equation is satisfied for the triplet x, δ i , δ o )
Attack on 21 Rounds. The impossible differential trail described in Fig. 3 can be extended by six and four rounds in backward and forward direction as will be explained in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.
It is possible to find plaintext pairs P, P and related-tweakey pairs K, K such that if the tweakey pairs differ only in nibble position 11, then there is no difference in the internal state after executing six rounds of SKINNY-64/128 with the plaintext-tweakey pairs (P, K) and (P , K).
Proof.
We will proceed to demonstrate how the required plaintext and tweakey pairs are generated. We choose the nibble at Position 11 to introduce the initial difference because after completing six rounds, the difference is shuffled to Cell 8 of the round key, which coincides with the beginning of the impossible-differential trail, shown in Fig. 3 . To begin, it can be seen that the AddRoundTweakey in the first round can be pushed behind the MixColumns operation by changing the first round key to Lin(K 1 ) where Lin = MC • SR represents the linear layer (please refer to Fig. 4 ).
2 can be selected in a specific form, so that in Round 6, the tweakey difference is zero. Let us denote δ 1 = tk
. In Round 6, the difference will appear in Cell 0 of the round key and so we want: Lin(K 1 )
0vv0 00v0 vv0v 0vvv 0vv0 000v 0vvv vvv0 0vv0 0vv0 000v 0vv0 0vv0 0vv0 000v 0vv0 0v00 0000 000v 0vv0 0v00 0000 0v00 vv00 0v00 0v00 0000 0v00 0v00 0v00 0000 0v00 So, if the attacker chooses δ 1 , δ 2 satisfying the equation δ 1 + L 3 (δ 2 ) = 0, then there is no difference introduced via the round-key addition in Round 6. The attacker should therefore follow the steps:
1. Take any Plaintext P and compute the state after the first round MixColumns, i.e. E 1 .
2. Take any three-nibble difference ∆ 1 , ∆ 3 , ∆ 4 to construct E 1 such that
The value of ∆ 2 will be determined shortly. The attacker can recover P by inverting the MC, SR, AC and SC layers on E 1 .
3. The attacker chooses the difference α in Cell 14 of E 2 . She calculates then
is a solution of the equation:
Note that according to Lemma 1, the equation above has one solution on average.
4. β needs to be equal to
. This is equal to tk
. So, the attacker chooses δ 1 and δ 2 satisfying δ 1 + L 3 (δ 2 ) = 0 and calculates β = δ 1 ⊕ L(δ 2 ). ∆ 2 can then be determined as a solution of the equation:
Again by Lemma 1, there exists on average one solution of the above equation. The attacker now has the values of ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ 3 , ∆ 4 and so, he can compute E 1 , E 1 and hence P, P .
5. However, the attacker still needs that in Round 4, the active nibble in
to make all the state cells inactive in C 4 , D 4 , and E 4 .
6. The attacker needs to guess three additional key values in Round 1 (i.e.
) and three additional key values in Round 2 (i.e.
If the attacker can guess these values, then he knows the actual values (marked with v) of the state cells for the plaintext pair P, P as opposed to only differences (marked by 0) in both Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 .
7. Guessing the tweakey nibbles mentioned above enables the attacker to calculate the value of B 3 [1] . Then, she calculates k
holds, we have:
Since the knowledge of the guessed key nibbles already allows the attacker to calculate
) is the solution to the equation above. Again, Lemma 1 guarantees one solution on average. Since the attacker has already determined k
, this also determines the values of tk 1 1 [7] and tk 1 2 [7] . 8. This guarantees that there are no more active nibbles after Round 4. The key difference does not add to the state in Round 5, and due to the fact that δ 1 + L 3 (δ 2 ) = 0, the tweak difference becomes 0 in Round 6.
Thus, by guessing six and calculating three key nibbles, we can construct P, P and K, K so that the internal state after six rounds has no active nibbles.
Lemma 4. Given C, C as the two output ciphertexts after querying plaintexttweakey pairs (P, K) and P , K as described above, to a 21-round SKINNY-64/128 encryption oracle. Then for a fraction 2 −40 of the ciphertext pairs, it is possible to construct a backward trail for round 21 to round 18 by guessing intermediate tweakey nibbles so that there are no active nibbles in the internal state at the end of round 17.
Proof. The attacker starts working backward from the ciphertext pairs C, C and proceeds as follows (illustrated in Fig. 5 [7] are already known, the attacker can calculate the actual values in Cells 0, 8, and 12 in A 21 for the ciphertext pairs. These have to be equal since they are the output of the 20 th -round MixColumns operation on the leftmost column which had only one active nibble in its input. If the active Cells 8 and 12 are different, the attacker can reject the pair. This adds another filter with probability 2 −4 . 4. Since the actual values in Cell 0 in A 21 for the ciphertext pairs were already calculated in the previous step, the attacker checks if the value of the active Cell 0 is equal to that of Cells 8 and 12, and rejects the pair otherwise. This adds another filter of probability 2 −4 . 8. The value of the active nibble in cell 10 of A 20 is given as:
The attacker determines
Since the leftmost column of D 20 is known, the attacker can calculate η, which must be equal to Cell 14 of A 20 since they are output of the 19 thround MixColumns operation with one active input nibble. This is given as:
It holds that
. By calculating Equations (2) and (3), the attacker can solve for
One solution on average is guaranteed by Lemma 1. 
11. The final condition to be satisfied is that the active nibble in Cell 8 of A
19
has to be equal to δ 1 ⊕ L 9 (δ 2 ) = γ.
Note that 
Attack Algorithm
Now, we put together the findings of Lemma 3 and 4 into an attack procedure:
1. The adversary chooses a random base plaintext P and requests the corresponding ciphertext C for (P, K).
2. She chooses fixed differences δ 1 and δ 2 such that δ 1 = L 3 (δ 2 ).
For each nonzero difference
-With the value of (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ 3 , ∆ 4 ), compute P -Get the ciphertext C for (P , K).
-If C ⊕ C does not pass the 2 −36 filter (Step 1, 2, 3 in Lemma 4), then abort and start again.
-If they pass the filter: the adversary can guess seven tweakey cells (2 28 guesses) and calculate 17 key/tweak cells as follows: The 17 tweakey nibbles used for elimination are therefore: (a) tk
(c) tk -Therefore, the adversary has a set of 2 28−4 = 2 24 wrong key candidates.
The procedure above is repeated with 2 x chosen plaintexts until a single key solution remains for the 17 nibbles of the tweakey.
Complexity. For every plaintext, the adversary has (2 4 − 1) 3 choices of differences, and for each α she has on average one value of ∆ 2 . Since there are The attacker gets wrong solutions for 2 x−20+24 = 2 x+4 incorrect solutions for 17 nibbles. To reduce the keyspace to a single surviving key, we need:
For this, we need x = 70. So, the total number of encryption calls to 21-round SKINNY-64/128 is 2 70+16 = 2 86 .
Second Attack
This section presents a variant of the attack procedure that changes the way the related plaintext/tweakey pairs are constructed:
1. The attacker chooses the nibble values of the random base variable E 1 in all locations except Cells 5, 7, 8, and 15.
She chooses fixed differences
δ 1 , δ 2 satisfying δ 1 = L 3 (δ 2 ).
For each choice of (E
choices): -Calculate P by inverting the first round.
-Query the 21-round encryption oracle for P, K and P, K.
So, for every choice of the base variable E 1 , we have 2 17 encryption calls. We can pair related plaintext and tweakey pairs in the following way: For every plaintext P i , choose a plaintext P j so that E 1 for P i and P j have a non-zero difference in all Cells 5, 7, 8, and 15. For every P i , there exist (2 4 − 1) 4 ≈ 2 15.6 such values of P j , and so 2 16+15.6 = 2 31.6 pairs to work with. The attack now proceeds as follows.
1. For each choice of P i , P j (2 31.6 choices): -Denote P = P i and P = P j .
-The attacker can choose α and proceed with the steps of the above attack with one exception: She can no longer choose ∆ 2 as in Step 4 of Lemma 3 since she has already chosen P, P , K, K.
-With probability 2 −4 (as per Lemma 2), the plaintext pair satisfies Equation (1) in Step 4 of Lemma 3 and proceeds; otherwise, she aborts.
-Request the ciphertext C for (P , K) and the ciphertext C for (P, K).
-If C ⊕ C does not pass the 2 −36 filter (Steps 1, 2, and 3 in Lemma 4), then abort and start again.
-If they pass the filter, the attacker can guess seven tweakey cells (2 28 guesses) and calculate 17 key/tweak cells as in previous attack.
-A fraction of 2 −4 tweakeys will fail the condition required in Step 4 of Lemma 4.
-Therefore, the attacker has a set of 2 28−4 = 2 24 wrong key candidates.
The above procedure is repeated with 2 x chosen plaintexts until a single key solution remains for the 17 nibbles of the tweakey.
Complexity. With 2
x such base plaintexts, the attacker has 2 x+17 encryption calls but 2 x+31.6 plaintext and hence ciphertext pairs. With probability 2 
Attacking 22-Round SKINNY-64/128 under Partially Known Tweak
The attack above can be extended to 22-round SKINNY-64/128 under the assumption that 48 of the 128 bits in the tweakey are publicly known tweak. In particular, we assume that tk [9, 10] ). Thereupon, the attack is almost the same as the previous attack except that the tweakey indices i = 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and their functions are known and need not be guessed.
Generate 2
31.6 plaintext/ciphertext pairs from every base choice of E 1 and 2 17 encryption calls.
2. For each choice of P i , P j (2 31.6 choices): -Denote P = P i and P = P j .
-The attacker can choose α and calculate k 1 [1] , k 1 [3] , and k 1 [7] as per Step 3 of Lemma 3.
-She can no longer choose ∆ 2 as in Step 4 of Lemma 3 since she has already chosen P , P , K, K.
-With probability 2 −4 , the plaintext pair satisfies Equation (1) in Step 4 of Lemma 3 and proceeds; otherwise, she aborts.
-As already outlined, the attacker need not guess the Round 2 tweakey nibbles in Step 6 of Lemma 3: i.e. functions of k 1 [8, 12, 15 ] since these are in the lower half of the tweakey blocks and therefore known.
-Retrieve the ciphertext C for (P , K) and the ciphertext C for (P, K).
-Guess k 22 [4, 5] which is tk The 16 tweakey nibbles used for elimination are therefore: (a) tk -Therefore, the attacker has a set of 2 24−4 = 2 20 wrong key candidates.
The procedure above is repeated with 2 x chosen plaintexts until a single key solution remains for the 12 nibbles of the tweakey. In this section, we extend the attack above to 23 rounds in the following manner: we will prepend one round at the beginning of the basic 22-round attack described in the previous section. In order to not disturb the notation, we denote
Complexity

Algorithm 1
The 23-round attack.
for all guesses of k 0 [9, 10] (2 8 guesses) do
The attacker computes P, P from E 1 , E 1 .
The attacker runs the 22-round attack.
the additonal round prepended at the beginning as the 0-th round. That is, the 23 rounds are labelled as rounds 0 to 22, and the variables A 0 , B 0 etc. are defined as above. The plaintext is denoted by A 0 and the ciphertext by E 22 . Note that, from the base value of E 1 , the plaintext can be calculated if we guess k 0 [9, 10] . Therefore, the attack we define is as given in Algorithm 1. There are two principal differences to the 22-round attack:
1. When the attacker guesses k 22 [4, 5] For each initial guess of k 0 [9, 10] , the guessed and calculated key bytes are the following: The 14 tweakey nibbles used for elimination are therefore:
) for i = 9, 10 As before, a fraction of 2 −4 tweakeys fails the condition in Step 4 of Lemma 4. Therefore, the attacker has a set of 2 24−4 = 2 20 wrong key candidates.
Complexity. For each iteration of the outer loop, the complexity is calculated as follows: For every base value of E 1 , the attacker makes 2 17 encryption calls.
Out of those, he has 2 31.6 pairs to work with. For each pair, the attacker can choose then α in 2 4 − 1 ways, which gives her around 2 35.6 initial guesses for the forward key nibbles
, of which only a fraction of 2 −4 passes the filter in Equation (1) . So, the attacker has 2 31.6 pairs to work with. In effect, for every pair (P i , P j ) there is only once choice of α going forward on average.
Time complexity = max 2 x+17 encryptions, 2 x+31.6−44+20 guesses = 2 x+17 .
The attacker gets wrong solutions for 2 x+31.6−44+20 = 2 x+7.6 incorrect solutions for 14 nibbles. To reduce the keyspace to 1 we need:
For this, we need x = 54. So, the total number of encryption calls to 22-round SKINNY-64/128 is 2 54+17 = 2 71 . Multiplying this by 2 8 for the outer loop gives us the total complexity 2 71+8 = 2 79 which is just short of exhaustive search for the 80-bit key.
Conclusion
In this paper, we outline related-key impossible-differential attacks against 21-round SKINNY-64/128 as well as attacks on 22 and 23 rounds under the assumption of having 48 of the 128-bit tweakey as public tweak. Our attacks are based on an 11-round impossible differential trail, to which we prepend six and append five rounds before and after the trail, respectively, to obtain an attack on 22 rounds. Finally, we show that we can prepend a 23-rd round under similar assumptions. 
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